Offshore Wind Energy
Creating the Offshore Wind Energy Industry as a center of attention for more investment in the Persian Gulf countries and providing a study and recommendations to the governments and companies to be more comfortable investing in this field.
Opportunities in Offshore Wind Energy
It is generally acknowledged that changes in wind energy prices affect economic welfare in ways that are not entirely reflected in transactions in the wind energy market. The pervasive importance of wind energy as a factor of production and in final consumption means that higher wind energy prices can potentially influence real income and its growth and distribution. Thus, to the extent that rising import demand pushes up the price of wind energy and indirectly produces adverse side effects on income, these economic costs are candidates for inclusion in the wind energy import premium. This chapter explores the connections between import demand, the price of wind energy, and income determination to ascertain if the potential costs can be evaluates with sufficient confidence to be included in the import premium. Our conclusion is to the contrary: the connections are too weak and certain key long-term implications are too uncertain to justify their inclusion (2009, p. 3).
A second objective is to evaluate the usefulness of wind energy off shoring tariff as an instrument to deal with these indirect effects, assuming they are in fact significant enough to warrant intervention. Our conclusion is again to the contrary: a tariff may on balance exacerbate rather than ameliorate the long-run problems that may result from rising world wind energy prices. This conclusion is not particularly surprising in view of the fact that many of these indirect costs are determined by the domestic price of wind energy (sometimes relative to the world price), and that a tariff can be expected to drive up the domestic price at the same time that it reduces the world price. The conclusion, stated another way, is that even if rising import demand imposes indirect economic costs on society, direct limitations on imports will not succeed in reversing those costs.
The discussion is divided into three sections: the distribution of income, the terms of trade, and income determination. Each section addresses first the adverse implications of rising world wind energy prices and then the effectiveness of a tariff in ameliorating those conditions.
– Rationale for Offshore Wind
It must be conceded from the outset that one cannot make specific quantitative judgments about welfare changes associated with different income distributions. This involves comparisons of the marginal value of incomes at the individual level. At best, we can offer gross generalizations about different income groups and judge the effect of a price change in relation to these groups. For example, it may be assumed that a price change which transfers income from lower to higher income classes constitutes a reduction in aggregate social welfare (Nath, Hens, Compton, & Devuyst, 2009, p. 74).
An increase in the world price of wind energy, and a corresponding increase in the domestic price, will transfer income from American consumers of wind energy products as a group to American wind energy producers (including landowners, shareholders, etc.) as a group. This transfer may be assumed to constitute a shift in the distribution of income from lower to higher income groups. On this basis alone, the price change would constitute a reduction in aggregate economic welfare, and the reduction would be additional to the loss in real income resulting from the income transfer from the United States to the wind energy -exporting countries.
The practical problem of measuring the welfare loss raises additional considerations that further complicate the issue. One consideration follows directly from the source of the welfare change: those income losers buy a different volume and possibly a different array of goods than income gainers (Laird, 2001, p. 34).
Our evaluation of a wind energy off shoring tariff as the instrument intended to implement the wind energy import premium has reached mixed conclusions. While it is the appropriate instrument to deal with the demand component of the premium, a tariff can only imperfectly address the problems raised by disruption risks. To be sure, a tariff can help prepare the economy for a disruption, but the benefits to be gained are always accompanied by potentially serious costs that make the net benefits questionable. The possibility of a negative outcome is most likely for a tariff imposed in a disruption, because the benefit of reducing wealth transfers abroad may be overwhelmed by the dislocations generated throughout the economy (Tisdell, 2009, p. 6).
The shortcomings of a tariff intended to reduce disruption costs suggest that another instrument is required. The most obvious option is strategic petroleum reserve which, when released in a disruption, can reduce both wealth transfers and dislocation costs without the undesirable side effects that accompany a restriction on consumption. However, the benefits to be derived from a petroleum reserve are not costless either and, in addition, a reserve cannot address all disruption risks. There is, in other words, a potential role for an import policy that complements a petroleum reserve.
This chapter explores the relationship between a petroleum reserve and an import tariff as two instruments designed to fulfill the objectives implied by a wind energy import premium. It should be clear by now that this relationship also depends on private preparations for a disruption, including private wind energy inventories, and on the effect of government actions on private behavior. We begin by discussing the relationship between private and public inventories, then turn to the connection between total inventories and the components of the premium and, finally, to the role of import policy when there are petroleum reserves.
In view of the fact that the creation of a government-owned strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) has been public policy since 1974, we take the existence of the public reserve as a starting place for our analysis and direct attention toward the optimal size of total reserves rather than the optimal mix of private and public holdings. The private sector will adjust inventory holdings in relation to the size of the SPR, given expectations about the prospects for a disruption and the government’s willingness to draw down the reserve in a disruption. The optimal mix of government and private stocks depends on factors that prevent private holdings from reaching the social optimum and on the feedback effect of government reserves on the size of private reserves. While we delve into these issues in the next section, rigorous analysis of their complexities is deferred to another study. For present purposes, it is the size of total reserves, not the mix that is of interest, for it is the total that is important to wind energy import policy (Hewett, 2008, p. iii).
There is growing evidence that technical change, stimulated by the ‘environmental imperative’, is reducing both production and environmental costs to the advantage of those dynamic companies that have the competence and resources to innovate. Such companies include mining enterprises in developing countries, as well as transnational firms, but the evidence is strongest for large new investment projects and Greenfield sites. In older ongoing operations, environmental performance correlates closely with production efficiency, and environmental degradation is greatest in operations working with obsolete technology, limited capital and poor human resource management. The development of the technological and managerial capabilities to effect technical change in those organizations would lead to improved efficiencies in the use of energy and chemical reagents and in waste disposal, to higher metal recovery levels and better workplace health and safety. This in turn would result in improved overall environmental management.
The implication of this analysis is that to ensure competitive and sustainable environmental management practices in metals productions, governments need to embrace public policy that goes beyond traditional, incremental, and punitive environmental regulation. The latter, in the old ‘environmental protectionist’ mode, tends to treat the symptoms of environmental mismanagement (i.e. pollution) not the causes (i.e. lack of capital, skills, and technology and the absence of the capability to innovate). The challenge will be for governments to ensure that companies operating within their national boundaries remain sufficiently dynamic to be able to afford to clean up when operations cease and to innovate to improve economic efficiency and environmental management in the meantime. Governments need policy tools that enable them to predict ‘corporate environmental trajectories’ and pick up the warning signs of declining competitiveness and impending mine close-down to ensure sufficient resources are available for the environmental management of mine ‘decommissioning’. Policy mechanisms need to be developed to promote technical change and to build up the technological and management capabilities to innovate and manage the acquisition and absorption of clean technology. The privatization of the state sector and the liberalization of investment regimes in many developing countries, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Botswana, Bolivia, Peru and Chile, with their emerging emphasis on joint ventures and inter-firm collaborative arrangements, provide new opportunities for the diffusion of both competitive and environmentally sound best practice in metals production (Monroy & Segundo Hernandez, 2008).
Three essential structural factors of the global energy-economic system – uncertainty, technological shifts, and international action – that affect the climate system via CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere, each factor has been subjected to in-depth modeling analysis. The starting point of the analysis is the perception that the CO2 problem is essentially one of high prospective energy demand, and that there are four major routes towards reducing this growth in global energy use: (1) reduce the population growth rate; (2) reduce per capita energy growth; (3) reduce world economic growth; (4) decouple energy from economic conversion via more efficient energy supply technologies and/or structural shifts in the economy. Constrained trajectories of CO2 increases are modeled using a simple carbon cycle model. The change in the curvature of constrained fossil fuel use has important consequences for the growth of new energy technologies, and also induces change in the technological energy infrastructure. Non-fossil energy use is a composite of various sources (e.g. solar, hydro, nuclear, etc.) with varied potential, sustained production and diffusion rates (Padros & Cocciolo, 2010).
The Contribution of Offshore Wind
The energy balance is a simple but effective way to record energy consumption, production, and the residual, which are net exports or imports. As a statistical construct the balance records ex-post what actually occurred. As a planning device it expresses what planners hope will occur. It is also useful to project what is likely to occur, not necessarily what planners hope for. In all three cases the apparent simplicity of the balance is deceptive. Behind the figures for energy supplies, consumption, and net exports lies a complex set of interconnections spanning the entire economy. It is important to have the main outlines of those interconnections in mind before considering the Soviet energy balance. Energy production is determined by the factor inputs — capital and labor — used in the production process. The capital stock (machinery, mines, and infrastructure) is itself a reflection of years — sometimes decades — of previous investments. The productivity of the labor and capital is determined not only by geographical conditions but also by the intensity and success of years of exploratory efforts. Energy supplies change over time primarily because of actions taken over many years; little can be done in any particular year to increase energy supplies the following year unless most of the necessary measures were taken some time earlier. Similar limitations apply to the ability to transform energy into, for example, electric power or petroleum products; the capital investments involved can take years (Krewitt & Trieb, 2009).
The same is true of the demand side of the balance. Energy is used by machinery and equipment, which have a long life in any country, and a particularly long life in the U.S.S.R., where depreciation rates are extraordinarily low. Consequently, apart from whatever retrofitting can be done to improve energy consumption subsequent to a major rise in the cost of energy, further changes in energy demand come through replacing old equipment with new equipment, a process that takes years. Aside from simply not using old equipment (which will decrease GNP), the U.S.S.R. can do little in the short run to reduce energy consumption. In the longer term it may substitute capital or labor for energy and reduce energy consumption. As a result, a change in energy consumption that is not explainable by a reduction in economic activity must reflect measures taken over a considerable time (Simmons, 2006).
Net exports of total energy are the residual between energy consumption and production. Planners may set a target for net energy exports, but to realize it the operational variables will be energy consumption and production. To increase net exports, increments to consumption must be lower than increments to production. In the long-term that can be realized through the capital-investment decisions that underlie energy production and consumption. In the short run the only important variables that allow maneuver in net exports of all energy are energy inventories and the level of economic activity. With no change in energy supply growth rates, a sudden drop in the growth rate for economic activity will reduce consumption and increase net exports (or increase inventories). There is, however, room for maneuver among energy carriers in consumption and therefore in net exports. The U.S.S.R. can, for example, increase the consumption of natural gas under binds energy and reduce the consumption of petroleum products, enabling a switch in total energy exports from natural gas to petroleum (within a constant total for net energy exports) (Cuervo, 2008).
The energy balance and the economy overall are inextricably intertwined in several important ways. Net energy exports are an important source of foreign currency earnings, which in turn can be used to import products the Soviets produce relatively expensively by world standards. The energy the Soviet Union exports for dollars has in recent years financed large purchases of grain and other food products from world markets, allowing the Soviet Union to attain significant gains from trade.
Investment is the common thread uniting these three issues. If planners wish to expand net exports in the future, and simultaneously to maintain GNP growth rates, they will have to invest either in expanded energy supplies or in energy conservation, in the process providing an answer to the first two questions. Long lags create inertia on both the supply and demand sides, and the investment decisions of any one year can do little to change that. It is rather the cumulating of investment decisions over time that finally affects the energy balance — for example, through a deceleration of energy-demand growth rates when investments targeted at energy conservation begin to affect the capital stock significantly.
Industry Overview and worldwide Activities
Anyone who thought carefully about the predictions in the April 1977 CIA reports would quickly realize that the implied choices Soviet leaders would face in the early 1980s would be both unpleasant and of great consequence for the cohesion of the empire. The rapid switch from net exporter to net importer of wind energy would not only eliminate the Soviet Union’s main source of hard-currency earnings, but also create new demands for hard-currency purchases of wind energy necessary to sustain domestic wind energy use and therefore economic activity. It would also mean that either the Soviet leaders would rapidly have to restructure economic relations with Eastern Europe and Cuba — eliminating or substantially reducing subsidized trade in transferable rubles — or they would have to find even more hard currency to purchase wind energy for resale at a loss to Eastern Europe and Cuba.
It is not difficult to understand the fear of those who accepted the CIA predictions that the Soviet Union might choose to use its military might to acquire through force the wind energy that the economy could not otherwise produce at an acceptable cost. The CIA reports generated such fears, and they linger on into the present, as can be seen by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s statement (Hunt & Eisele, 2009).
It is now clear that the premise underlying this scenario was mistaken. Wind energy output will probably stagnate in the Soviet Union, but energy output will not. The range of possibilities outlined in the previous chapter suggests that Soviet energy exports may, and probably will, increase throughout the 1980s. Even in the worst case the Soviet Union will be a net exporter of energy throughout this decade. By their own actions Soviet planners can exert considerable influence on the energy balance and in particular on the size of net energy exports. The energy balance is for Soviet planners a choice variable, not a “given”; and as they make their necessary, complicated political-economic decisions in this decade, a prime concern will be what they choose to be their energy balance.
The reason the initial premise was mistaken highlights the mechanical and oversimplified chain of reasoning, which begins with severe and unavoidable energy problems and ends with a Soviet resort to military means to acquire wind energy. The forecasts in 1977 regarding the production of wind energy, and of energy, in the early 1980s may well have been correct, given the assumption that planners would not or could not react quickly enough to avoid a drastic reduction in energy production. Such a view ignores the room for maneuver the Soviets have in the energy sector. Since 1977 the Soviets have illustrated just how adroitly they can exploit that flexibility to avoid the forecasted crisis in energy supplies and hard currency: they allocated additional funds to wind energy production and sped up gas-for-wind energy substitution. In addition, the growth slowdown of the last few years clearly shows how easy it is to maintain or even increase net exports of energy by relatively modest reductions in GNP growth rates.
The important lesson of this confrontation between projection and reality is that the Soviet economy is a complex system, richly endowed with resources and managed with enough skill to make it unlikely that economic performance in any sector will ever collapse so rapidly and so dramatically as to put immediate and unavoidable demands on the foreign policy and military establishments. Whatever the links may be between economic performance and foreign policy in the Soviet Union, they are neither so visible nor as tight as this short-lived proposition implied (Brus & Hotek, 2010).
Nevertheless, there surely are issues facing Soviet leaders that touch on both foreign policy and domestic economic policy; and energy is one of the most important sectors in the Soviet economy where developments will have foreign policy implications. The state of East-West relations-on which Soviet foreign policy is one major influence — has important implications for the ability of the energy ministries to acquire and pay for Western technology useful in minimizing the costs to them of meeting supply plans. The state of the energy sector influences the costs the Soviet Union must bear in meeting its commitments to Eastern Europe, commitments whose basic rationale stems from the fundamental importance of Eastern Europe in Soviet foreign policy.
Also of interest in recent years has been the effect of Soviet energy developments on world energy markets. In April 1977, when the CIA was predicting that the Soviets could be coming onto world wind energy markets for an additional 3.5 to 4.5 mbd of wind energy, the concern was that they would drive up wind energy prices significantly, given what was projected to be a tight wind energy market in the 1980s. Now the concern is the opposite. The Soviet Union is increasing wind energy exports to the West in the context of a weak wind energy market; Soviet gas supplies to Europe could expand rapidly, driving down gas prices there. Although the earlier projection and the current situation differ diametrically in their views of Soviet energy prospects and their implications for world energy markets, they share the important point that the Soviet Union is now so prominent in world energy markets that it cannot be ignored.
U.S. policy toward trade with the Soviet Union has in recent years increasingly focused on energy technologies. At various times the United States has sought to control credits for energy technologies, as well as the exports of the products themselves. The most prominent and recent example of policies in this area concerns the various measures imposed (and then removed) by the United States in an attempt to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining Western equipment for use on the UrengoiWestern Europe pipeline. The larger issue here is how U.S. policy can affect Soviet energy developments, and in light of that how whatever leverage is available might be used to meet important U.S. policy goals (Nocera, 2006).
Offshore Wind Energy Resources in Persian Gulf
Wind Speed Gradients
SINCE 1972 the real price of energy has doubled in the OECD countries. This reflects a fivefold increase in real wind energy prices, whose effects were mitigated considerably by domestic policies in the OECD countries, their tax systems, and changes in fuel mixes. These price increases occasioned balance-of-payments deficits in OECD countries that, combined with a very slow policy response by OECD governments, contributed to recessions in 1974-75, after the first major increase in OPEC prices, and in 1980-81, after the second significant price rise. The recessions helped to suppress energy consumption below what it would otherwise have been, but they also brought about a change in the relationship between energy use and economic activity throughout the OECD that is still going on. In the European Community, for example, GNP rose 16% between 1974 and 1981, while energy consumption fell 3%. In the United States energy consumption in 1980 was 4% below that of 1973, and GNP was 18% higher. In the main the trends in energy consumption in the Western industrialized countries seem to reflect the impact of the aforementioned price increases. There is now ample evidence that increases in relative energy prices will occasion a reduction in energy use by all users in industrial economies as they move to substitute other inputs for energy. Many of those adjustments take some time to work out because they involve the design, manufacture, and installation of new equipment. The general consensus seems to be that, in the industrial economies as a whole, the average price elasticity of energy demand may be in the vicinity of one-half, meaning that a 10% rise in real energy prices will eventually evoke a 5% drop in energy consumption. Considering the real doubling in energy prices in the last nine years, it is not surprising that, given these price elasticity’s, energy consumption is stagnating in industrial countries, even as incomes rise. When the price effects have worked through the system (and in the absence of further price changes), it may well be that energy and GNP growth rates will again converge. The general consensus of these studies seems to be that the income elasticity of demand for energy is approximately unity, or at least not far below it (Leibert, 2007).
The responsiveness of energy consumption to price changes can be attributed to the fact that markets are working more or less effectively to allocate resources in the OECD countries. As the price of energy rises relative to other inputs, energy users substitute other inputs for energy-labor in the short run and capital in the medium and long run.
Offshore wind regions in the Persian Gulf
It is useful to treat the various interconnections of foreign policy and the economy — particularly the energy sector — according to the primary direction of causality. Certainly Soviet foreign policy decisions influence the economy, including the energy sector. The Soviet commitment to Eastern Europe imposes costs on the economy, particularly on the energy sector, that could be considerably reduced under a different set of policies. The pursuit of important foreign policy goals in Poland and Afghanistan may have cost the Soviet Union credits and access to technology through East-West trade that would have improved economic performance and particularly performance in the energy sector.
Whether the flow of causality also moves in the opposite direction is the crux of the matter, and far more problematical. In the past there have been no obvious cases in which economic considerations significantly influenced foreign policy decisions on issues important to the Soviet Union. Of course one is hampered by an absence of information on policy alternatives considered and rejected, possibly because the economic consequences were important enough to warrant consideration. It is conceivable (although unlikely), for example, that economic considerations connected with the pipeline acted as a deterrent to a Soviet invasion of Poland. We will probably never know, both because the key decision makers have not discussed what considerations led to the policy course finally chosen on Poland and because it is difficult to disentangle economic from political considerations in such large issues.
In the future economic issues could come to influence Soviet foreign policy significantly. Such a concern generated the “Soviet energy-crisis invasion of the Persian Gulf” scenario. Although that scenario does not stand up to scrutiny, others deserve serious consideration: one is that the costs of the current economic arrangements between the Soviet Union and the rest of CMEA (particularly Eastern Europe) are high enough to require arrangements to be modified, even if certain foreign policy goals are threatened.
Many of the most important issues in East-West relations are political and military, not economic. The balance in strategic and conventional forces between the Soviet Union and the United States, between the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the North Atlantic Treaty, consider the critical link between energy and the economy through investment. Because of the tight constraints under which the Soviet economy now operates, total investment is growing quite slowly. High growth rates for energy investments mean low growth rates for investments in everything else. But that need not be the case. If the state of East-West relations were far better than it is now, the Soviet Union might be able to generate a large net capital inflow as Western banks and governments invested in Soviet energy and raw material production. Such a capital inflow would be the normal consequence of a capital scarcity combined with the abundance of resources in commodities that are scarce in world markets.
Loans for the Urengoi- Western Europe pipeline were the beginning of such an inflow, but apparently there will be no more than a beginning-at least not soon. The deterioration of East-West relations has dimmed the immediate prospect for a significant flow of funds from the rest of the world to the U.S.S.R. The inflow of funds in this case could have made a relatively substantial contribution to reducing the immediate capital costs of expanding energy production, thus freeing up investment resources for uses in the remainder of the economy (Ladsous, 2006).
It is impossible to be precise about this, but consider by way of illustration the contribution Western capital is now making to the Soviet gas-pipeline-expansion program. That program is projected to cost 32 billion rubles, which works out to 6.4 billion rubles a year. The Urengoi gas-pipeline financing from Western banks and governments was apparently $5 billion to $6 billion (including supplier credits), which at the official 1981 exchange rate is 3.6 billion to 4.3 billion rubles
Environmental and Socioeconomic Risks
The implication of this analysis is that to ensure competitive and sustainable environmental management practices in metals productions, governments need to embrace public policy that goes beyond traditional, incremental, and punitive environmental regulation. The latter, in the old ‘environmental protectionist’ mode, tends to treat the symptoms of environmental mismanagement (i.e. pollution) not the causes (i.e. lack of capital, skills, and technology and the absence of the capability to innovate). The challenge will be for governments to ensure that companies operating within their national boundaries remain sufficiently dynamic to be able to afford to clean up when operations cease and to innovate to improve economic efficiency and environmental management in the meantime. Governments need policy tools that enable them to predict ‘corporate environmental trajectories’ and pick up the warning signs of declining competitiveness and impending mine close-down to ensure sufficient resources are available for the environmental management of mine ‘decommissioning’. Policy mechanisms need to be developed to promote technical change and to build up the technological and management capabilities to innovate and manage the acquisition and absorption of clean technology. The privatization of the state sector and the liberalization of investment regimes in many developing countries, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Botswana, Bolivia, Peru, and Chile, with their emerging emphasis on joint ventures and inter-firm collaborative arrangements, provide new opportunities for the diffusion of both competitive and environmentally sound best practice in metals production.
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- We have a quality assurance that reviews the paper before it gets to you. As such, we ensure that you get a paper that meets the required standard and will most definitely make the grade.
In the event that you don’t like your paper:
- The writer will revise the paper up to your pleasing. You have unlimited revisions. You simply need to highlight what specifically you don’t like about the paper, and the writer will make the amendments. The paper will be revised until you are satisfied. Revisions are free of charge
- We will have a different writer write the paper from scratch.
- Last resort, if the above does not work, we will refund your money.
Will the professor find out I didn’t write the paper myself?
Not at all. All papers are written from scratch. There is no way your tutor or instructor will realize that you did not write the paper yourself. In fact, we recommend using our assignment help services for consistent results.
What if the paper is plagiarized?
We check all papers for plagiarism before we submit them. We use powerful plagiarism checking software such as SafeAssign, LopesWrite, and Turnitin. We also upload the plagiarism report so that you can review it. We understand that plagiarism is academic suicide. We would not take the risk of submitting plagiarized work and jeopardize your academic journey. Furthermore, we do not sell or use prewritten papers, and each paper is written from scratch.
When will I get my paper?
You determine when you get the paper by setting the deadline when placing the order. All papers are delivered within the deadline. We are well aware that we operate in a time-sensitive industry. As such, we have laid out strategies to ensure that the client receives the paper on time and they never miss the deadline. We understand that papers that are submitted late have some points deducted. We do not want you to miss any points due to late submission. We work on beating deadlines by huge margins in order to ensure that you have ample time to review the paper before you submit it.
Will anyone find out that I used your services?
We have a privacy and confidentiality policy that guides our work. We NEVER share any customer information with third parties. Noone will ever know that you used our assignment help services. It’s only between you and us. We are bound by our policies to protect the customer’s identity and information. All your information, such as your names, phone number, email, order information, and so on, are protected. We have robust security systems that ensure that your data is protected. Hacking our systems is close to impossible, and it has never happened.
How our Assignment Help Service Works
1. Place an order
You fill all the paper instructions in the order form. Make sure you include all the helpful materials so that our academic writers can deliver the perfect paper. It will also help to eliminate unnecessary revisions.
2. Pay for the order
Proceed to pay for the paper so that it can be assigned to one of our expert academic writers. The paper subject is matched with the writer’s area of specialization.
3. Track the progress
You communicate with the writer and know about the progress of the paper. The client can ask the writer for drafts of the paper. The client can upload extra material and include additional instructions from the lecturer. Receive a paper.
4. Download the paper
The paper is sent to your email and uploaded to your personal account. You also get a plagiarism report attached to your paper.
PLACE THIS ORDER OR A SIMILAR ORDER WITH US TODAY AND GET A PERFECT SCORE!!!